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INTRODUCTION
As their dockets swell, federal judges' tolerance for attorney mis
conduct wears thin.1 More than ever, j udges are willing to impose
sanctions for abuses of federal court processes, including frivolous ap
peals.2 As one judge explained, " [w]ith courts struggling to remain

1. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that, "[a]s should be evident to any regular reader of federal court decisions, the frequency
with which federal judges are imposing sanctions for abuse of federal court process has in
creased markedly in recent years").
2. See, e.g., Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(awarding attorney fees and double costs):
This is another in what appears to be a gradually increasing number of frivolous appeals to
this court .... [Appellant] has based its appeal on baseless arguments and an attempt to re
try its case, employing baseless arguments and misstatements of the record. That it found
those practices necessary should have told it this appeal was frivolous.
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afloat in a constantly rising sea of litigation, a frivolous appeal can it
self be a form of obscenity. "3
Aside from the need to reduce caseloads, other factors underlie
the courts' willingness to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. One
concern is that the costs to responsible, ethical litigants increase
sharply when the court system's resources are diverted to meritless
claims.4 Another motivating factor is the simple desire to "insur[e] jus
tice to the appellee."5 Also exacerbating courts' frustrations with
frivolous appeals is their realization that, as the judiciary and bar have
grown, attorneys' incentive to regulate themselves has weakened be
cause it is now less likely that any attorney will have to appear regu
larly before the same judge.6
Congress provided federal judges with an arsenal of statutes and
rules they may use to impose sanctions and thereby defend themselves
against abusive tactics.7 Chief among them, Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure states: "If a court of appeals determines
that an appeal is frivolous, it may . . . award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee."8 Pursuant to Rule 38, federal appellate
courts have found it appropriate to impose sanctions in a variety of
cases, such as when the arguments presented in an appeal are "utterly
baseless,"9 when the arguments presented are irrelevant or bizarre,10

Id.; Hill, 814 F.2d at 1203 (imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and reminding the bar that " [t]his court has been plagued by ground
less lawsuits seeking to overturn arbitration awards . . . if [the suit] is frivolous in whole or
part this court will impose sanctions"); see also Anastasia Parnham Campbell, Comment,
Frivolous Civil Appeals: How to Avoid Sanctions, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 135, 137 (2001) (citing
SANCTIONS: RULE 11 & OTHER POWERS (Melissa L. Nelken ed., ABA 3d ed. 1992)).

3. WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983) (arguing that "Rule
38 [of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] should doubtless be more often enforced
than ignored in the face of a frivolous appeal").
4. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1203.
5. 16A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.1,
at 646 (3d ed. 1999).
6. See Hill, 814 F.2d at 1203.
7. For example, a federal court may impose a sanction in the amount of costs, expenses
and attorney fees against an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unrea
sonably and vexatiously." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2001). Courts also may use the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1912 to penalize frivolous appeals, since this provision provides that an appellate
court can award single or double costs as damages for delay. 28 U.S.C § 1912 (2001)
("Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its
discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or dou
ble costs."). Also, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court can
sanction a party and/or the party's attorney for filing groundless pleadings, motions, or other
papers. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
8. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
9. E.g., Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) (ordering
plaintiff and counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed where they "have
appealed and persisted on appeal in arguments which are utterly baseless, and patently in-
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when "there [are] no reasonable, good-faith arguments advanced for
the extension, modification, or reversal of precedent,"11 and when it is
clear that an appellant filed an appeal simply to delay the inevitable.12
Furthermore, appellate courts have generally understood that it is
within their authority to raise sua sponte the issue of Rule 38 sanc
tions.13
Rule 38's language, however, gives little guidance as to when a
court should award such sanctions. From the Rule's use of the word
"may," it is clear that whether to impose sanctions under the Rule is
discretionary.14 If it were mandatory, a word such as "must" or "shall"
might have been used, as it is in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.15 Because Rule 38's language makes no mention of whom
to sanction, it is also unclear whether the appellant, the appellant's at
torney, or both should bear the burden of such sanctions. Further
more, the Rule neither defines what are "just" damages nor indicates
the circumstances appropriate for imposing single costs, as opposed to
double costs.16 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 38 do not give

consistent with a massive body of authority, as well as raising claims - all specious - not
fairly raised in the complaint under review").
'·

10. E.g. , Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 261 (1st Cir. 1996) (assessing double
costs as "just damages" for the appeal where "a cursory reading of the relevant case law and
treatises would have shown" that the appeal was frivolous, and where the appellant's attor
ney presented bizarre and irrelevant arguments on appeal).
11. Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1988).
12. E.g. , SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1993) (imposing double costs un
der Rule 38 because the appeal was "nothing more than a frivolous play for time, delaying
the inevitable by wasting the resources of this court and the [appellee] SEC alike").
13. E.g. , Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1225 (1991); Coghlan, 852 F.2d
at 809; Hill, 814 F.2d at 1203; Reis v. Morrison, 807 F.2d 1 12, 113 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e have
decided to use our authority under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to
award attorney's fees on our own initiative . . . . ") .
14. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
15. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c) ("If . . . the court determines that subdivision (b) has been
violated, the court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or
parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation."); see also 16A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984.1, at 646 ("The 'just damages and single or double
costs' mentioned in Rule 38 are awardable by the court as a matter of discretion."); cf Ross
v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1089 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that "it is within the
sound discretion of the district court whether to grant or to deny sanctions under § 1927"
because, unlike the "shall" language in Rule 11, a court "may" award fees under section
1927). The Wright treatise explains:
In most cases, the appellee must file a motion to have the damages and costs awarded to it,
although the court sometimes may perform the task for the appellee in its opinion affirming
or dismissing the appeal. But the grant of such an award under Rule 38 remains within the
discretion of the court of appeals, which can either assess the damages itself or remand the
case to the district court to make that determination.

16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984, at 643.
16. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
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courts any clues about how to solve these questions. 17 The circuits do
not take a uniform approach to solving these questions, either.18 The
only way to predict the resulting sanction - or lack thereof - is to
determine what a particular circuit's attitude toward imposing sanc
tions has been in the past - aggressive, reluctant, or uncertain.19
Furthermore, there is visible disagreement over the elements of
Rule 38. The Sixth Circuit recently noted a split between circuits on
the issue of whether Rule 38 requires evidence of bad faith before a
court can impose sanctions under the Rule.20 One scholar, Robert J.
Martineau, previously identified the crux of the courts' disagreement.21
Some courts impose Rule 38 sanctions for an objectively meritless ap
peal, regardless of whether there is any evidence of bad faith.22 Pursu
ant to this objective approach, a court focuses exclusively on the rec
ord, briefs and argument and, essentially, asks whether a "reasonably
prudent attorney" would have filed the appeal.23 In contrast, another

17. See FED. R. APP. P. Advisory Comm. Note (1994 Amendments) (referring vaguely
to the "person to be sanctioned").
18. See generally Robert J. Martineau & Patricia A. Davidson, Frivolous Appeals in the
Federal Courts: The Ways of the Circuits, 34 AM. U. L REV. 603 (1985) [hereinafter Mar
tineau, Ways of the Circuits].
For an outline of various Rule 38 awards given by federal appellate courts of various cir
cuits, see Kevin Brown, Award of Damages or Costs Under 28 U.S.C.A. or Rule 38 of Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Against Appellant Who Brings Frivolous Appeal, 61 A.LR.
FED. 319 (2000), and Kevin D. Hart, Annotation, What Circumstances Justify Award of
Damages and/or Double Costs Against Appellant's Attorney Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1912, or
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 50 A.LR. FED 652 (2000).

19. See Martineau, Ways of the Circuits, supra note 18, at 605-06 (categorizing circuits as
either "aggressive" circuits, which regularly assess sanctions, "reluctant" circuits, which
rarely assess sanctions, or "uncertain" circuits, which have demonstrated no apparent trend).
20. See Wilton Corp. v. Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670, 676-78 (6th Cir. 1999)
(listing cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts
of Appeals, which have embraced an objective approach, as well as cases from the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, which have required some evidence of bad
faith).
21. In his article entitled Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984
DUKE LJ. 845 (1984) [hereinafter Martineau, Frivolous Appeals], Martineau examines the
sources of authority for the imposition of sanctions, as well as the cases in which sanctions
have been assessed. Martineau argues:
[I]t is imperative that when courts impose sanctions for frivolous appeals, they do so in ac
cord with a procedure that is consistent with due process requirements. It is also essential
that courts develop a clearly articulated definition of frivolous appeals, indicating, in par
ticular, whether an objective or subjective standard is used. Further, they must clearly distin
guish between (1) a sanction imposed for taking a meritless appeal, and (2) a sanction im
posed for abusive litigation tactics during the pendency of an appeal with merit.
Id. at 849. Martineau concludes by proposing a revision in the statutes and rules governing
the assessment of sanctions by federal courts of appeals. Id. at 878-85.

22. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 854-55 (citing NLRB v. Lucy Ellen
Candy Div. of F&F Labs., Inc., 517 F.2d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1975)) (using a reasonable and
objective standard to measure bad faith for purposes of its Rule 38 analysis).
23. Id. at 855 (citing Flaherty v. Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 187 (Cal. 1982); Kirsch v.
Duryea, 578 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal. 1978)).
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set of courts reads a scienter24 requirement into Rule 38. Pursuant to
this subjective approach, a court demands at least some evidence of
bad faith before imposing Rule 38 sanctions.25 Conceding that the is
sue of whether bad faith is an element of Rule 38 is still not "free of
doubt," the Sixth Circuit sided with the set of courts that use an objec
tive approach.26
Both the subjective and the objective approaches to Rule 38 have
some identifiable problems. A court that makes a subjective inquiry
into bad faith· may be reading into the Rule a requirement that its
drafters did not intend. On the other hand, courts that apply a purely
objective test may threaten an attorney's ability to fulfill his ethical
duty to represent with zeal the interests of his client27 - a conse
quence that can also create a "chilling effect" on novel appeals.28 Also,
a purely "objective" test may achieve inequitable results when either
pro se appellants or attorneys who work for large institutional clients
and exercise little control over the litigation are held to the same stan
dard as those attorneys who are experts in their fields and those who
do exercise control over the litigation.29

24. "Scienter" is defined as: "1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally re
sponsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been
done knowingly . . . 2. A mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or de
fraud." BLACK'S LAW D ICTIONARY 1347 (7th ed. 1999).
25. See, e.g., Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 854 (citing TIF Instru
ments, Inc., v. Collette, 713 F.2d 1 97, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (awarding against attorney because
appeal urged in bad faith); Miracle Mile Ass'n v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.
1980) (refusing to award attorney fees absent bad faith); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) ("[I]mposition of [Rule
38] sanctions . . . is highly unusual and requires a clear showing of bad faith"). "Bad faith" is
defined as "[d]ishonesty of belief or purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (7th ed.
1999).
26. See Wilton Corp. v. Ashland Casing Co., 188 F.3d. 670, 677 (6th Cir. 1999).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.3[1] cmt. (1998) ("A lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."). The First Circuit explained:
The mere finding that a position advanced was frivolous must not be cause for discipline of
the attorney because of the danger that such action might inhibit the bar from the most vig
orous advocacy of the clients' positions and thus restrict meaningful access to the court. Fur
thermore, an attorney would face an intolerable dilemma when the needs or instructions of
his client would force him to argue a position which he personally may feel to lack merit, and
which could lead to punitive action against him by the court.
In re Samuel A. Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1973).

28. See Wilton, 188 F.3d at 677; Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141 , 145 (3d Cir. 1993):
We are well aware that the injudicious awards of Rule 38 damages may have the potential to
chill the zeal for pursuing novel questions and difficult appeals . . . . [S]ometimes a question
able appeal may be due to mere overzealousness or inexperience of counsel, and it is some
times difficult to draw the line "between the tenuously arguable and the frivolous."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
.

29. See infra Sections 11.B and IIl.B.
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In recognition of these sorts of problems, some ambivalent courts
have articulated various two-part tests in their Rule 38 analyses. In
Zahran v. Schmidt, the Seventh Circuit used a two-part test: "First, the
court must conclude that the appeal is frivolous, and second, that sanc
tions are appropriate."30 Under the first step of the Zahran test, an ap
peal is frivolous if "the result is foreordained by the lack of substance
to the appellant's arguments"31 or if the appeal "merely restates argu
ments that the district court properly rejected."32 Under the second
step, sanctions are appropriate only if the court has some "indication
that the appeal was prosecuted for delay, harassment, or out of sheer
obstinacy, with no reasonable expectation of altering the district
court's j udgment."33 Other courts have implemented, and some com
mentators have advocated, similar two-part tests calling for a thresh
old inquiry into objective meritlessness, followed by an inquiry into
the subjective intent of the appellant or the appellant's attorney.34

30. No. 97-3710, 98-2123, 99-1710, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7284, at *12 (7th Cir. Mar. 10,
1999) (citing Depoister v. Mary M. Holloway Found., 36 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 1994)). The
Zahran court concluded that plaintiffs' "failure to address dispositive legal issues in their
case brings this matter within reach of our broad observation in Newlin v. Helman that plain
tiffs who have been told that their claims are foreclosed and then who appeal without offer
ing any argument to undermine the district court's conclusions are acting in bad faith." Id. at
*14.
31. Id. at *12 (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'! Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir.
1989)).
32. Id. (quoting A-Abart Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 956 F.2d 1399, 1406-07
(7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
33. Id. at *13 (citing Flexible Mfg. Sys. Party Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 101
(7th Cir. 1996)). The Zahran court applied this two-part test to determine that Rule 38 sanc
tions were appropriate not only because appellants omitted and failed to distinguish signifi
cant cases in their opening brief, but also because the district court had told them that their
claims were foreclosed. They nevertheless appealed without offering any argument to un
dermine the district court's conclusion. See id.; see also Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra
note 21, at 852-53 n.38-43, 48-50 (listing cases where courts have inferred bad faith from cer
tain types of conduct, including refusing to participate in discovery or other court-ordered
activities, making misstatements, key omissions, or other misrepresentations in the briefs,
and filing an appeal despite the previous dismissals of similar lawsuits or similar meritless
appeals).
34. E.g. , Gilles v. Burton Constr. Co., 736 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that
even though the appeal is "frivolous" within the terms of Rule 38, it was not "appropriate"
to impose sanctions where appellants were not solely responsible for the confusing record
and had nothing to gain by delay or the harassment of an appeal); McCandless v. Great At!.
& Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that since "[t]he only litigants
who are likely to be deterred [from bringing frivolous claims] are those who are aware that
their claim is baseless but press on for some improper reason, such as harassment," it be
comes necessary to evaluate subjective bad faith at the second part of a two-step analysis)
(emphasis added); Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 870-71 (proposing that,
while the objective merits of the appeal are all-important to the initial determination of friv
olousness, the appellant's conduct (or that of his attorney) should only be significant to de
termine the nature and extent of the sanction to be imposed: "The more flagrant the con
duct, the clearer it is that the intent or motive of the person is culpable and the larger the
sanction should be . . . . [T]he conduct or intent should be the measure of the sanction, not
the measure of the merit of the appeal").
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This Note argues that Rule 38 requires federal appellate courts to
apply a single-step, objective standard that does not take into account
the subjective state of mind of the appellant or the appellant's attor
ney. It also argues that it is appropriate for courts imposing Rule 38
sanctions to command the appellant's attorney, rather than the appel
lant, to pay for the appellee's actual costs and attorney fees. Part I as
serts that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of Rule
38 indicates that the Rule has a scienter requirement and proposes a
single-step "reasonable attorney" test for defining frivolity under Rule
38. Part II argues that a court should ordinarily impose the full burden
of Rule 38 sanctions upon the appellant's attorney, rather than the ap
pellant. This approach is best because, if a reasonable attorney stan
dard is appropriate for defining frivolity, it also makes sense to disci
pline the attorney who acted unreasonably by making the frivolous
arguments, rather than to discipline the client who was not responsible
for the merits of those arguments. In cases where the attorney repre
sents a sophisticated institutional client that does not rely completely
on the advice of its attorney, however, a court should impose Rule 38
sanctions jointly on the attorney and the client to ensure that all of
those responsible for the appeal's frivolity will bear the burden of such
sanctions. Part III explains why a single-step reasonable attorney test
best advances the policy goal of deterring frivolous appeals. This Part
also argues, however, that cases involving pro se appellants warrant an
exception to the reasonable attorney test. This Note concludes that, by
using a single-step reasonable attorney test and by imposing the full
burden of Rule 38 sanctions against the attorneys responsible for filing
meritless appeals, federal appellate courts can deter frivolous appeals
and, in so doing, keep themselves afloat in the rising sea of litigation.
I.

RULE 38 WARRANTS A SINGLE-STEP "REASONABLE
ATTORNEY" TEST

This Part argues that, in deciding whether to impose Rule 38 sanc
tions, a court should apply an objective, single-step "reasonable attor
ney" test. Section I.A asserts that Rule 38 is an objective rule focused
on the merits of an appeal, rather than the bad faith of an appellant or
an appellant's attorney. Section LB argues that courts should apply a
reasonable attorney test to determine whether an appeal is frivolous
for purposes of Rule 38. To avoid a chilling effect on novel appeals,
however, a court should be careful to classify as frivolous only those
appeals that have no colorable legal support. Section LC maintains
that only one step of objective analysis is necessary. No subjective
"second step" is necessary to determine when a sanction is necessary
to assign blame or to calculate a just sanction.

Rule 38 Sanctions
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Rule 38 Has No Scienter Requirement

A textual analysis of Rule 38's plain language demonstrates that
the Rule has no scienter requirement, and therefore, does not require
an inquiry into the bad faith of the appellant or the appellant's attor
ney. To determine Rule 38's requirements, one should focus on the
ordinary meaning of the Rule's language in its textual context, and
then ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies.35 The plain language of
Rule 38 makes no mention of a scienter requirement: "If a court of
appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a sepa
rately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportu
nity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the
appellee. "36
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a rule allowing sanctions against an attorney
who multiplies proceedings "vexatiously,"37 Rule 38 has no language
corresponding to the term "vexatiously" that gives courts a text-based
j ustification for reading a bad faith requirement into the Rule.38 Courts
should not interpret the word "frivolous" to include bad faith intent.
The ordinary meaning of the word "frivolous," when referring to an
argument, is "trifling," "trivial," "of little value or importance," or
35. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917):
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan
guage in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitu
tional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms.
Id.; NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 81-83 (5th ed. 1992).
For examples of courts applying a "plain meaning" approach, see Estate of Cowart v. Niklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (construing section 33(g) of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-102
(1991) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1988); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
241-42 (1989) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291-92 (1988) (construing the Tariff Act of 1930); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 36Hi8 (1986) (construing the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956).

36. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
37. Pursuant to section 1927:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or
any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa
tiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and at
torneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 u.s.c. § 1927 (2001).
38. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (comparing
the texts of Rule 38 and § 1927). Because appellees have requested sanctions under Rule 38
and section 1927 at the same time, making basically the same arguments in support of both
requests, some courts have incorrectly assumed that Rule 38 does in fact have a state of
mind requirement. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993)
("The City's arguments in support of its request for Rule 38 sanctions are essentially the
same as its arguments for sanctions under Rule 11 and pursuant to § 1927."). The Ross court
required "some evidence of bad faith" before Rule 38 sanctions could be imposed. Id.
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"not worth notice" - bad faith is not a part of the definition.39 Like
wise, in a leading law dictionary, the first definition of "frivolous" is
purely objective: "lacking a legal basis or legal merit,"40 and a "frivo
lous appeal" is objectively defined as "[a]n appeal having no legal ba
sis."41 Furthermore, the legislative history of Rule 38 makes no defini
tive statement about scienter.42 Thus, there is no clear indication that
an appellant's bad faith - or that of his attorney - is relevant at any
stage of the Rule 38 analysis.43 Although the Rule's silence concerning
scienter may not be dispositive evidence of Congressional intent,44
there still is no clear indication that any permissible meaning other
than the ordinary meaning of the Rule's language should apply. The
Rule's objective language, therefore, lends support to courts that have
argued that Rule 38 is concerned only with the objective merits of an

39.

WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

735 (2d. ed. 1983).

40. BLACK' S LAw DICTIONARY 677 (7th ed. 1999). Black's dictionary lists "not serious"
and "not reasonably purposeful" as second and third definitions, respectively. Id. While it
may be possible that these second and third definitions could be interpreted as subjective, it
would nonetheless be a stretch to interpret either to mean "bad faith." Furthermore, that
they are listed as second and third definitions should indicate that they are not as common
place as the first definition, which is purely objective.
41. Id. The definition of "frivolous appeal" also explains that such appeals are "usu(ally]
filed for delay to induce a judgment creditor to settle or to avoid payment of a judgment."
Id.

42. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 Advisory Comm. Notes (1967). The Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 38 make clear that, under the Rule, a court of appeals need not require a
showing that the appeal in question resulted in any kind of "delay." Id.
43. See Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1991):
[T)he subjective intent of Romala and its attorneys in making irrelevant arguments and
grossly inaccurate statements is immaterial . . . The controlling consideration in the imposi
tion of sanctions, then, is the consistently inaccurate and irrelevant character of Romala's as
sertions of fact, which is clear on the face of the briefs and for which no exonerating explana
tion is possible. Since our imposition of sanctions is thus based on a frivolity that is wholly
contained within the written submissions, no separate briefing or argument on the issue
would be useful.(citation omitted).

Id.; Hill, 814 F.2d at 1202 (asserting that the question under Rule 38 should never be
whether an appellant's attorney has made "frivolous legal arguments willfully, or mali
ciously, or with 'conscious indifference' to their validity, or otherwise in bad faith," since the
standard for imposition of sanction under Rule 38 is an objective one that does not take into
account factual issues such as the personal motives of the individual sanctioned); see also In
re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[A]ll of Perry's relevant conduct appears in the
record, in Perry's briefs, and in Perry's oral argument. An oral hearing would thus not de
velop or illuminate new relevant factual issues and would not aid this court." (citing Hill, 814
F.2d at 1201) ).

44. See Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Heeding
the Supreme Court's recent warning, '(w]e do not rely on Congress' failure to act' as disposi
tive evidence of congressional intent." (citation omitted)); Brown v. Sec'y of Health & Hu
man Servs., 46 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 1995) ("(N]onaction by Congress is ordinarily a dubious
guide . . . ." (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994))).
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appeal, rather than the subjective bad faith of the appellant or the ap
pellant's attorney.45
B.

A n Objective Approach to Defining Frivolity:
A "Reasonable Attorney " Test

Because " [f]rivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define,"46
courts need a method for determining when an appeal is frivolous for
purposes of the Rule 38 analysis. Using a "reasonable attorney" test,
courts can exercise a level of objectivity that is consistent with that re
quired by the plain language and legislative history of Rule 38. It is
useful to compare the reasonable attorney test to the negligence stan
dard in tort law. The concept of negligence incorporates the notion of
the "reasonable person" into tort law.47 The reasonable person is an
entirely objective, external standard defined by the community, rather
than a subjective standard that focuses on the individual j udgment or
motivations of the particular actor.48 Similarly, pursuant to Rule 38, a
court should hold appellants and their attorneys to a "reasonable at
torney" standard - an objective, external standard defined by the le
gal community which does not take into account the subjective intent
of that attorney.49 At its core, Rule 38 analysis should "depend[] on

45. See, e.g., Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) ("(The Rule 38) inquiry is
an objective one, focusing 'on the merits of the appeal regardless of good or bad faith.' " (ci
tation omitted)); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 995 F.2d 1138, 1147 (2d Cir.
1993) (explaining that the standard for imposing a "frivolous appeal" penalty is whether "the
appeal taken is found to be groundless, without foundation, and without merit"); In re Perry,
918 F.2d at 934 (holding that bad faith was not a requirement for imposing sanctions for a
frivolous appeal, and that the standard is an objective one and has nothing to do with the
mental state of the person sanctioned); Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir.
1989) ("(S)ubjective bad faith is not a prerequisite to an award of damages and double costs;
an appeal lacking foundation is sufficient."); Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 814 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that evidence of bad faith was not required to impose sanctions upon the ap
pellate counsel for filing a frivolous appeal); Hill, 814 F.2d at 1202.
46. WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983).
47. See generally w. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS§ 32 (5th ed. 1984).
48. Id.§§ 31-32.
49. E.g., Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'!, 899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990). As the Third Circuit
reasoned in another case involving a frivolous appeal:
Careful analysis of the record and research of law should have led [the attorney], as it would
any reasonable attorney, to conclude that he simply had no factual basis for the lawsuit. A
reasonable attorney would have concluded that [the appeal] was wholly devoid of merit.
Upon that conclusion our inquiry ends and Rule 38 sanctions become appropriate. It would
be fundamentally unfair to [appellee) if we permit [appellant] to compel [appellee] to court
to defend an appeal that is wholly devoid of merit, without facing sanctions for doing so. It is
a hollow victory indeed for an appellee who successfully defends a frivolous appeal, if it is
then further penalized by fee payments to its own attorney. Accordingly, we will award at
torney's fees in (the appeal], plus costs, as a sanction for pursuing a frivolous appeal.
Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the work product: neither the attorney's state of mind nor the prepara
tion behind the appeal matter. "50 The only appropriate question for
purposes of the Rule 38 analysis should be: "whether, following a
thorough analysis of the record and careful research of the law, a rea
sonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous."51 Where
it "should have been obvious" to the reasonable attorney that the ap
peal is frivolous, Rule 38 sanctions are appropriate.52
The determination of whether the appeal's frivolity should have
been obvious to a reasonable attorney calls for the court to make an
assessment of the quality of the arguments presented in the appeal.
That a court can accomplish this objective, yet nuanced analysis in this
context is clear from cases where courts declined to award Rule 38
sanctions because the arguments supporting an appeal, while objec
tively meritless, did not rise to a degree of frivolity deserving of a Rule
38 sanction. In Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity &
Mortgage Investments, the court did not impose Rule 38 sanctions be
cause the appeal was not "wholly without merit."53 Similarly, in
Meredith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the court re
frained from imposing sanctions because, even though the appellant's
presentation of the facts was a "pitch for a reversal" that was "way
outside," it was "not so wild [a pitch] that sanctions for a frivolous ap
peal are warranted."54 Also, in Matter of Sherk, the court held that the
attorney's "bad habit" of "citing overruled cases" in the brief did not
rise to the level of frivolity that, in its judgment, warranted a Rule 38
sanction.55 These cases demonstrate that a court can make this deci
sion in an objective fashion that does not take into account the subjec
tive intent of the offending attorney. Furthermore, these cases show
that application of an objective reasonable attorney standard is not

50. See Berwick Grain Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Agric., 217 F.3d 502, 505 (2000) (quoting
Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'I Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 938 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane)).
51. See Hilman, 899 F.2d at 254; see also E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Svcs.,
907 F.2d 1274, 1280 (1st Cir. 1990); 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984, at 857 (Supp.
1995) (explaining that "sanctions are available on the basis of an objective determination
that reasonable counsel should have been aware that the appeal must fail"); David Lopez,
Why Texas Courts are Defenseless Against Frivolous Appeals: A Historical Analysis With
Proposals for Reform, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 148 (1996):

Federal appellate courts blend the relevant federal screening devices . . . into a single test, to
wit: Would a reasonable attorney have known that the appeal had no chance of success? The
test is entirely objective in nature. Moreover, the federal courts do not require that an ap
peal be wholly devoid of merit; sanctions are proper even in a case that joins meritorious
points with frivolous ones.
Id. at 148 (citing McEnery v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 963 F.2d 1512, 1516-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).

52. See Berwick, 217 F.3d at 505.
53. 951 F.2d 1399, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1991).
54. 935 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1991).
55. 918 F.2d 1170, 1178 (5th Cir. 1990).
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overly harsh on attorneys because the bar for reasonableness is set
quite low.
One significant danger of a purely objective Rule 38 analysis is that
courts taking such an approach will chill novel or untested legal argu
ments.56 It can be difficult in some cases for any judge to " draw the
line 'between the tenuously arguable and the frivolous. ' "57 Further
more, from a more cynical point of view, any judge has the power to
write an opinion making an appellant's argument seem frivolous, even
if a dispassionate review of the law would suggest that the appeal has
at least some merit.58 Thus, it is easy to see how an objective standard
for Rule 38 could discourage an attorney from pursuing novel legal ar
guments on behalf of his client. This result, of course, could interfere
with a lawyer's ethical duty to "act with commitment and dedication to
the interests of the client and with zeal and advocacy upon the client's
behalf."59
To mitigate the chilling effect on novel meritorious arguments,
courts should move with caution, classifying as frivolous only those
appeals that lack "colorable" support or are wholly without merit.60
Colorable arguments are those that seem to be "true, valid, or right."61
To ensure that this standard is not hollow, a court should, in its expla
nation of why an appeal is frivolous, point to specific indications of the

56. See Hilman, 899 F.2d at 253.
57. Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Finch v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 926 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
58. See Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (Parsons,
J., dissenting) ("A judge awarding sanctions is often advocating the correctness of his deci
sion and is likely to do so convincingly . . . . [A judge in an] opinion 'has the power to make
an attorney's argument seem frivolous.' ") (quoting Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions under Rule
11
Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339-40 & n.172 (1986) (citation omitted)).
-

59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (1998).
60. See, e.g., Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 n.1 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to
impose Rule 38 sanctions in a related appeal wherein "[appellant] presented a marginal ar
gument which, albeit poorly articulated, raised a "colorable argument"); Hilman, 899 F.2d at
253 ("This court has been reluctant to classify appeals as frivolous, so that novel theories will
not be chilled and litigants advancing any claim or defense which has colorable support un
der existing Jaw or reasonable extensions thereof will not be deterred."); see also, e.g., Nagle,
8 F.3d at 145 (quoting Finch, 926 F.2d at 1578); Zarowitz v. BankAmerica Corp., 866 F.2d
1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Too exuberant use of sanctions could chill some meritorious ap
peals. We therefore hesitate to exercise our discretion by imposing a sanction in this case,
even though the appeal borders on the frivolous."); Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64, 70
n.9 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1 162 (1986) (denying the government's motion for
sanctions because, even though most taxpayers' arguments on appeal are frivolous, appellant
raised a genuine issue in this case).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (7th ed. 1999); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 449 (1993) (defining "colorable" as "seemingly valid and
genuine: having an appearance of truth . . . : Plausible").
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appeal's meritlessness.62 For example, courts have made clear that an
appeal has absolutely no chance of success if the appellant's brief
makes only conclusory allegations with no factual underpinnings,63 if
the brief on its face has no intelligible, ascertainable claims,64 or if the
appellant filed the appeal in the face of long-established precedent,
but gave no explanation for why this precedent must be pushed
aside.65 Courts have also made clear that an appeal is not frivolous
simply because it fails to cite obscure or ancient precedent.66 Thus, by
applying a reasonable attorney test, and by classifying an appeal as
frivolous only when an appeal lacks colorable support, courts not only
can define frivolity in a manner that is consistent with the objectivity
required by the ordinary language of Rule 38, but also can mitigate the
chilling effect a purely objective approach could have on arguments
that are novel, but meritorious .
C.

Only One Step of Objective Analysis Is Necessary

The objective assessment of the merits of an appeal, described in
Section I.B, is all that is necessary to determine whether an appeal is
frivolous for purposes of the Rule 38 sanction.67 Some courts, however,
implement a subjective second step to the Rule 38 analysis.68 Such
courts analyze the surrounding circumstances to determine whether
the appellant or the appellant's attorney pursued the appeal in bad

62. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 850 ("When a court finds an ap
peal to be frivolous, it usually labels the appeal as 'utterly without merit' or 'no chance of
success.' In attaching one of these labels to the appeal, the courts point to various indicia of
hopelessness.").
63. See, e.g., McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1983); Wood v. McEwen,
644 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982).
64. See, e�g. Burke v. Miller, 639 F.2d 306, 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (referring to the argu
ments presented in the appellate brief as "legal spun sugar"); White v. United States, 588
F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1978); Mancuso v. Indian Harbor Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th
Cir. 1978).
.

65. See, e.g., Watson v. Callon Petroleum Co., 632 F.2d 646, 648 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
'
that the appeals were frivolous and did not "present a novel or unsettled question of
Mississippi law"); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 39 (2d
Cir. 1978) ("[I]t is too well established . . . to require dilation here."); In re Newport Harbor
Ass'n, 589 F.2d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1978) (explaining that there was a "consistent body of
precedent"); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Notwith
standing the clear state of law, Furbee pressed his appeal.").
66. E.g. , Sparks v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A lawyer does not expose
himself to sanctions merely by failing to dig up some obscure precedent." (citation omit
ted)).
67. See supra Section LB.
68. E.g., Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); Ruderer v. Fines,
614 F.2d 1128, 1 132 (7th Cir. 1980).
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faith.69 Courts taking this two-step approach, therefore, do not com
pletely ignore the objective nature of Rule 38; rather, they take the
position that an additional, subjective inquiry is permissible because it
comes after the objective inquiry. If a court determines in its second
step of analysis that there is no evidence of bad faith, it may decide not
to impose a Rule 38 sanction, even though it determined in its first
step of analysis that the appeal is objectively frivolous.70
Some courts mistakenly apply a two-step analysis because of their
confusion over the procedures for assessing sanctions, as well as the
source of their authority for doing so. After all, there are no standard
procedures for courts to follow in their deliberations over whether to
assess sanctions.71 Furthermore, the precedent concerning a court's
authority for imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 can also seem
cloudy; many courts who have assessed sanctions previously neglected
to indicate whether they were relying on Rule 38, the court's inherent
authority, or section 1927 of the U.S. Code to impose sanctions for the
filing of a frivolous appeal.72 Rule 38 alone provides authority for im
posing sanctions, and the reasonable attorney test provides a method
for courts to follow.
Other courts mistakenly use a two-step approach because they rea
son that an inquiry into the subjective intent of the appellant or the
appellant's attorney is necessary to make a fair judgment about who is
actually responsible for the frivolous nature of the appeal,73 even when
it is already determined that the legal arguments presented in support
of the appeal are objectively meritless.74 These courts typically con
sider whether the appellant, or the appellant's attorney, has a good
faith defense which might absolve him from responsibility.75 For ex-

69. See Ross, 5 F.3d at 1090 (requiring, in addition to objective meritlessness, "some
evidence of bad faith").
70. See Martineau, Ways of the Circuits, supra note 18, at 661. After reviewing many de
cisions of the different United States courts of appeals, Martineau concluded that reluctant
circuits require "evidence of purposeful, intentional harassment or delay creat[ing] a stan
dard of frivolousness so high that only the most excessive conduct invokes the authority to
impose sanctions." Id.
71. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 872.
72. Id. (explaining that this problem is "particularly acute" when the court is acting sua
sponte, rather than in response to a motion filed by an appellee, because a motion or sup
porting memorandum will likely cite a statute or rule as the basis for the motion).
73. See, e.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987) ("But the deter
mination to impose sanctions on an attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal involves [a sec
ond] step - placing the blame. And there remains for consideration the defenses which
might absolve the lawyer of the responsibility for taking the frivolous appeal.").
74. See, e.g., id.; Herzfeld & Stern v. Blair, 769 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting that
Counsel's "lack of good faith is manifest" in using baseless appeal to delay the payment of
judgment and also by his "cavalier" or reckless mis-citation to the record, which "added
grievously to the frivolous nature of his appeal").
75. See Braley, 832 F.2d 1504; Herzfeld, 769 F.2d 645.
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ample, in Gilles v. Burton Construction Co. ,76 even though the court
found that the appeal was objectively frivolous for purposes of Rule
38, the Seventh Circuit decided that it was not appropriate to impose
sanctions because the appellants were not "solely responsible" for the
confusion surrounding the appeal of a nonappealable order.77
A single-step reasonable attorney test, though, properly focuses on
the conduct of the person who is typically responsible for the merits of
an appeal - the appellant's attorney.78 Professional ethics bind an at
torney, rather than his client, to do the necessary research to assess a
claim's merits;79 failure to do so is a per se violation of that attorney's
ethical duty to his clients, as well as to the court system.80 An attorney
who files a frivolous appeal breaches his affirmative ethical duty to
make meritorious legal arguments on the client's behalf.81 An attorney
76. 736 F.2d 1 142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1984).
77. Id.
78. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that "blame for
[the frivolous] appeal rests upon [appellant's] attorney, and usually so should the burden of
any sanctions").
79. See also Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Fri
volity in argument is no doubt attributable at least as much to tactical decisions made by an
attorney in writing briefs as to the overall appellate strategy to which the client may specifi
cally consent."); Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1 192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987) ("We
also do not suppose, however, that a railroad brakeman is responsible for frivolous legal ar
guments, so we are minded to order Hill's counsel to bear personally the expense incurred
by the railroad.").
80. See McCandless v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1983):
Unlike a party, an attorney should be able to do the necessary research to evaluate properly
the merits of a claim. Furthermore, it would seem that the personal animosity often existing
between the actual litigants would be less likely to exist on the part of the attorney, toward
either opposing counsel or his or her client. . . . Before filing suit, it would seem to be a rea
sonable expectation that the attorney do some basic research on the applicable law.
Id. In Hilmon Co.

v.

Hyatt Int'/, the Third Circuit explained:

[The test is whether, following a thorough analysis of the record and careful research of the
law, a reasonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous.] Here, the blamewor
thy acts consist of either ignoring or purposely disregarding the law and procedure. These
are areas of expertise customarily committed to counsel and not the party. We see no reason
whatsoever why the burden of attorney error or ignorance should fall full upon [appellant],
who had a right to rely upon its attorney . . . who is responsible for pursuing the frivolous
appeal.
899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346 (3dCir. 1991).
81. See Hi/mon, 899 F.2d at 254:
[A]ttorneys have an affirmative obligation to research the law and to determine if a claim on
appeal is utterly without merit and may be deemed frivolous. We conclude that if counsel ig
nore or fail in this obligation to their client, they do so at their peril and may become per
sonally liable to satisfy a Rule 38 award.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1998) ("A lawyer shall not bring or

defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law."); Roger J. Miner, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Prac
tice: A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 333 (1999) ("The first ethical considera
tion for an attorney is whether to take an appeal at all.").
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has no ethical obligation to abandon his professional discretion just to
try to gain an advantage for a client.82 As one court reasoned, "Telling
would-be litigants that the law is against them is an essential part of a
lawyer's job."83 Thus, an attorney should refrain from advancing
meritless arguments simply to see if any will "stick," even if this dan
gerous appellate strategy is consistent with the client's wishes.84 Fur
thermore, in order to protect a court's ability to hear meritorious ap
peals, an attorney has a duty to refrain from appealing as a
"conditioned reflex."85 An attorney who files an appeal asks for the
court's attention, and therefore, has an affirmative responsibility to
the court to make reasonably well-developed arguments.86 A single
step reasonable attorney test for Rule 38 makes sense because it pro
vides a fair way of judging whether the attorney has lived up to the
ethical duties he owes both to his client and to the court.
Courts should also use the objective single-step test to determine
the level of sanctions to impose under Rule 38. One commentator
proposed that, after the first step of objective analysis, an inquiry into
the subjective bad faith of an attorney should be relevant to the meas
ure of the Rule 38 sanction.87 Given the objective nature of Rule 38,88
however, this approach would be textually defensible only if the actual
words of the current Rule were changed accordingly.89 Under the ex-

82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1] (1998) ("[A] lawyer is not
bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has profes
sional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.").
83. Bailey v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 819 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing In re TCI,
Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446-47, 450 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Pre
venting Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
300 (1986).
84. See Bradley C. Wright, Ten Mistakes to Avoid at the Federal Circuit, 17 No.2 INTELL.
PROP. L. NEWSL. 1, 8 (1999) ("Some appellants believe that if they include enough allega
tions of error in their appeal brief, at least one of them will stick and the judgment will be
reversed. That strategy almost always backfires. The weak and frivolous arguments included
in such a brief detract from any meritorious ones."); Miner, supra note 81, at 326 (explaining
reasons why many attorneys follow this dangerous appellate strategy, including their blind
adherence to their clients' wishes and their desire to demonstrate to their clients a willing
ness to fight to the end).
85. See Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (" 'About
half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned
fools and should stop.' ") (quoting 1 PHILIP c. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938)).
86. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also
In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 n.l (1st Cir. 1973) ("Lawyers have an obligation as officers
of the court . . . .Vexatious litigation and the law's delays have brought the courts in low re
pute in many instances, and when the responsibility can be fixed, remedial action should be
taken.'' (quoting Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178,179 (4th Cir. 1964)).
87. After a court finds that an appeal is objectively frivolous, the "[bad faith] conduct or
[bad faith] intent should be the measure of the sanction.'' Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, su
pra note 21, at 871.
88. See supra Part I.A (explaining that Rule 38 has no scienter requirement).
89. See Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 881. Martineau proposes that
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isting Rule 38, a court's j udgment of the objective merits of the appeal
is all that is relevant.w Thus, a second step of inquiry into subjective
bad faith of the appellant, or of the appellant's attorney, should not be
relevant to any stage of the Rule 38 analysis.
Using an appellee's actual costs and attorney fees as its measure, a
court can determine "just damages" in one objective step of analysis.91
The plain language of the Rule does not indicate that a remand is nec
essary for the determination of the appropriate level of fees,92 a_nd an
inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees and costs need not take
place, except in extraordinary circumstances.93 If, however, a court
finds it too difficult to determine the actual fees and costs, that court
can remand the issue to the district court.94
This is not to say that courts have no discretion at all as to the ap
propriate level of just damages and costs. The Rule expressly provides
for judicial discretion: courts "may" choose to award either "single or
double costs."95 Because the Rule has no scienter requirement,96
though, a court should in an objective fashion make its decision about
whether an appeal warrants a sanction of single costs or double costs
on the basis of how meritless the brief is.

the first section of Rule 38 should be amended to read:
A court of appeals shall impose a sanction upon a party or attorney or both for taking or
continuing an appeal or initiating a proceeding in the court that the court finds to be frivo
lous. For purposes of this rule, a frivolous appeal is one that has no reasonable legal or fac
tual basis.
Id.

· 90. See supra Sections I.A & LB.
91. See, e.g., Gen. Brewing Co. v. Law Firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca,
Peterson & O'Hearn, 694 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1982) (awarding damages in the amount of
reasonable attorney fees); Seyler v. Seyler, 678 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1982) (awarding damages
of reasonable attorney fees); Church of Scientology v. McLean, 615 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.
1980) (awarding damages including reasonable attorney fees); Libby, McNeill & Libby v.
City Nat'! Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 515 (9th Cir. 1978) (awarding damages of reasonable attorney
fees); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 568 F.2d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1978) (awarding
damages of $350 as attorney fees); First Nat'! Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 525 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1975)
(awarding damages to the extent of the reasonable fees of the attorneys); see also 16A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3984.2, at 693 (3d
ed. 1999) (explaining that this is the typical approach taken by courts).
92. See Wilton Corp. v. Ashland Castings Corp., 188 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Gilman, J., concurring).
93. See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3984.2, at 693-94 (explaining that '-'only in
'exceptional circumstances' may it be appropriate to inquire into the reasonableness of the
fees").
94. See, e.g., TIF Instruments, Inc. v. Collette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (award
ing costs and attorney fees, the amount to be determined on remand).
95. FED. R. APP. P. 38. The cost of the transcript and the cost of printing and photo
copying the appendix and briefs are likely to be the only significant costs. Martineau, Frivo
lous Appeals, supra note 21, at 866.
96. See supra Section I.A.
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The discretion Rule 38 gives courts to choose between single and
double costs, however, may seem to undermine the objective approach
to the Rule advocated by this Note. In Coghlan v. Starkey,97 for exam
ple, the Fifth Circuit makes its decision to impose single costs - as
opposed to double costs - in a manner that suggests that courts inevi
tably must consider the subjective state of mind of the appellant or the
appellant's attorney to make such a decision. Having concluded that a
"patently meritless" appeal warranted Rule 38 sanctions,98 the
Coghlan court sought to distinguish it from the more "egregious" ap
peals that j ustify an award of double costs.99 Rather than distinguishing
the appeal in a purely objective manner, however, the court seems to
suggest that what makes the appeal in question less egregious is the
"good faith impression" of the appellant's attorney that the lower
court's decision was erroneous.100 The court's consideration of the at
torney's subjective state of mind, however, was an unnecessary step courts have demonstrated an ability to make such decisions objec
tively.101 The Coghlan court, therefore, should have decided that the
only factor relevant to its decision concerning the appropriate level of
costs was the lack of rational argument presented in the appeal.102 As
this Part has shown, neither the plain language nor the legislative his
tory of Rule 38 indicates that scienter is relevant to the analysis, and
courts should apply a one-step reasonable attorney test focused on the
objective merits of the appeal.

97. 852 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 813 ("Rule 38 concerns are amply raised in this case by conclusory assertions
of an alleged right in an appellate brief that cites only two cases, and fails to explain even
those two.").
99. Id.
[T]he circumstances of this case are not egregious enough to justify compensation of the
prevailing party beyond its actual out-of-pocket outlays on appeal. Hence, we will not im
pose both attorneys' fees and double costs here. Nonetheless, the actions of plaintiffs coun
sel are sufficient to suggest the propriety of an award of attorneys' fees in addition to the
single costs normally assessed as of right against the losing party.
Id.

100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Strahl v. Mach. Tech., Inc., No. 89-16298, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9463, at
*2-3 (9th Cir. May 1, 1991) (awarding single costs pursuant to Rule 38 "[b]ecause [appel
lant's] claims are (objectively] meritless"); Adamsons v. Wharton, 771 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir.
1985) (deciding to assess double costs pursuant to Rule 38 because the appellant not only
contradicted precedent, but also failed to challenge the district court's finding).
102. The court identified that the appeal demonstrated a "total inability to distinguish
dispositive authority or make rational argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of precedent." Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 813.
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SANCTIONING THE APPELLANT' S ATTORNEY

This Part argues that a court can and should impose the entire
burden of Rule 38 sanctions on the appellant's attorney. Section II.A
asserts that, although this approach does not find explicit approval in
Rule 38's text, it is defensible for two reasons. First, the attorney is
typically the individual who is responsible for the merits of the argu
ments presented in a frivolous appeal. Second, Rule 46(c) of the Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure provides authority for this approach.
Section II.B proposes an "institutional appellant" exception to this
approach. In cases where the attorney represents a sophisticated insti
tutional party, a court should impose Rule 38 sanctions j ointly be
tween the client and attorney.
A.

Those Responsible Must Bear the Burden

Even though Rule 38's plain language makes no mention of whom
a court should sanction,103 it is appropriate for a court applying the
reasonable attorney standard to impose the full burden of Rule 38
sanctions on the appellant's attorney. If courts are to apply a reason
able attorney standard, it follows that sanctions for an appeal which
does not meet this standard should be brought against an attorney,
rather than a client. Furthermore, it is the attorney - rather than the
client - who is typically responsible for the objectively meritless ar
guments presented in a frivolous appeal.104 In Hill v. Norfolk, for ex
ample, where the appellant was a railroad brakeman with no practical
legal experience, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit ex
plained: " [W]e also do not suppose, however, that a railroad brake
man is responsible for frivolous legal arguments, so we are minded to
order [the appellant's] counsel to bear personally the expense incurred
by the railroad in briefing the issues that we have found were frivo
lously raised by [the appellant's] opening brief."105 Similarly, in
Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,106 the court decided
that assessing Rule 38 sanctions against the appellant's attorney,
rather than the appellant himself, was appropriate because the appel
lant had only a modest education; it therefore was unlikely that the
appellant was responsible in any truly meaningful way for the

103. See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
104. See Coghlan, 852 F.2d at 816-17 ("Plaintiff Coghlan may have been unreasonable in
her obdurate rejection of concession after concession, but blame for this appeal rests upon
her attorney, and usually so should the burden of any sanctions.") (citation omitted); Sparks
v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1987) (assessing Rule 38 sanctions against an attorney
whose brief showed an "elementary lapse" in research).
105. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987).
106. See 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976).
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meritlessness of the legal arguments presented in the frivolous peti
tion.107
Rule 38's silence on the issue of whether attorneys can be sanc
tioned arguably indicates that its drafters did not intend for these sanc
tions to be imposed against attorneys themselves. Unlike Rule 38,
Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides for
the imposition of sanctions against an attorney who files a groundless
motion.108 When courts hold attorneys liable for a Rule 38 sanction,
they most frequently cite 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a section that, unlike Rule
38, is explicit in its applicability to "attorney[s] or other person[ s] ad
mitted to conduct cases. " 109 Courts that do sanction attorneys pursuant
to Rule 38 often rely solely on precedent to do so.110
An analogy to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, shows that courts should interpret Rule 38's silence as a call
for the imposition of the full burden of such sanctions against an ap
pellant's attorney. Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
analogous to Rule 38 because it provides that a court can award sanc
tions for the filing of groundless pleadings, motions, or other papers,1 1 1
and some courts look t o Rule 11 for guidance i n interpreting Rule 38
in spite of the fact that Rule 11 does not apply to appellate practice.112
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1 1 explains that monetary
sanctions for frivolous contentions of law are "more properly placed
solely on the party's attorneys."113 An appellate court should therefore
take the view that, when an appeal is objectively frivolous, the attor
ney should naturally be the one to bear the burden of the monetary
sanction, regardless of that attorney's subjective good faith.114
107. See id. at 921.
108. See FED. R. Civ. P. ll(c) ("(T]he court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys . . . . "); see also supra note 7.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 868-69.
1 1 0. See, e.g., Romala v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Though
the language of Rule 38 does not explicitly provide for sanctions against attorneys, there is
ample precedent in this and other circuits for imposing Rule 38 sanctions on an attorney as
well as on the client."); Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt lnt'l, 899 F.2d 250, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
cases where Rule 38 damages were assessed directly against the offending attorney).
Even though Rule 38 and section 1927 of Title 28 have been used together, many courts
have relied on Rule 38 alone to impose sanctions against the appellant's attorney. Coghlan v.
Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 818 (5th Cir. 1988).
1 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
112. See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987).
1 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Note ("Sanctions that involve monetary
awards (such as a fine or award of attorney's fees) may not be imposed on a represented
party for causing a violation of subdivision (b)(2), involving frivolous contentions of law.
Monetary responsibility for such violations is more properly placed solely on the party's at
torneys.").
1 14. See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1993) ("It is manifestly evident
that the responsibility for paying these damages rests squarely upon counsel."); Mathis v.
Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (awarding sanctions under Rule 38 where analysis
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Rule 46(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
another source of authority for a court to assess sanctions directly
against an attorney pursuant to Rule 38.1 15 Rule 46( c) relates to disci
plinary proceedings against an attorney "for conduct unbecoming a
6
member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court rule. " 1 1
Courts have imposed Rule 46(c) sanctions against attorneys for their
negligence in multiplying proceedings by filing patently frivolous ap
peals117 - conduct not unlike that which courts can sanction pursuant
to Rule 38. Thus, a court can justify assessing Rule 38 sanctions
against an attorney as an imposition of a Rule 46( c) disciplinary sanc
tion, even though Rule 38 is silent as to this issue.118
Rule 46(c)'s hearing requirement, though, seems to present an ob
stacle to courts' justifying the assessment of Rule 38 sanctions against
an attorney as an imposition of a Rule 46( c) disciplinary action. To re
quire a hearing for the determination of Rule 38 sanctions would "im
pose on the opposing party and on the court an even greater burden in
dealing with a frivolous appeal and entirely defeat the purpose of Rule
38."119 Because Rule 46(c) has a hearing requirement that was not in
corporated into Rule 38,120 Rule 46(c) may not seem applicable to the
imposition of Rule 38 sanctions.121

of appellant's legal contentions, based on "record distortions, manufactured facts, and im
plausible and unsupportable legal arguments," compelled the conclusion that those conten
tions "lack even a minimally arguable basis and that this consolidated appeal is in major part
frivolous"); Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987).
115. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201 ("The imposition of Rule 38 sanctions directly on counsel
could be thought the imposition of a disciplinary sanction under Rule 46(c) . . . . ").
116. FED R. APP. P. 46 (c).
117. See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322-23 (1st Cir. 1973) (imposing disciplinary
sanction against attorney personally who was grossly negligent in his lodging multiple ap
peals of patent frivolity).
118. This argument may seem to contradict the argument advanced by this Note that a
state of mind requirement cannot be read into Rule 38 because the Rule is silent and be
cause there is no language corresponding to "vexatious," as there is in 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See
supra Section I.A. However, Rule 38's ordinary language does not indicate who should be
sanctioned, so a court must decide this issue for itself. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with
the ordinary language of Rule 38 for a court to assess sanctions directly upon an attorney as
an imposition of a Rule 46(c) disciplinary sanction. This approach should be distinguished
from one which voluntarily reads a state of mind requirement into Rule 38 and thereby ig
nores the plain meaning of the text.
119. Toepfer v. Dep't of Transp., 792 F.2d 1102, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Hyde v.
Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 992 (1985) (awarding damages under its Rule 49.2 without a hear
ing)).
120. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) ("(T]he court must afford the attorney reasonable notice, an
opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and, if requested, a hearing.").
121. See In re Perry, 918 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("This court has specifically held
that rule 46(c) has no applicability to the imposition of damages and costs under Rule 38."
(citing Toepfer, 792 F.2d 1102 )).
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The obstacle created by the hearing requirement, though, is over
come by the fact that, typically, the arguments that are frivolous as
filed in the appellate brief embody the sanctionable conduct. Because
a procedural hearing on sanctions is mandatory only if there is a con
tested factual issue, there can be no factual issue that creates a right to
a hearing when the appeal is frivolous as filed, regardless of whether
the right is expressly provided in a rule, as it is in 46(c).122 Thus, the ab
sence of a hearing requirement in Rule 38 does not fatally undermine
the arguments in support of justifying the assessment of Rule 38 sanc
tions directly against attorneys as a Rule 46( c) sanction.
This is not to say that an appellate court does not have a duty to
provide the attorney with notice and an opportunity to respond before
it imposes Rule 38 sanctions.123 Even though the unambiguous lan
guage of the Rule itself should provide attorneys with general notice
that they can be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal, actual notice
is required.124 This was not the case until the 1994 Amendment to Rule
38, which added the notice requirement.125 Yet, as discussed above, no
oral hearing is required because there are no factual issues - such as
the attorney's subjective intent - at stake.126 Therefore, an appellate
122. Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1 192, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1987).
123. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 Advisory Comm. Note (discussing 1994 amendments); see
also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (setting forth that the require
ments of due process are notice and opportunity to be heard).
124. Hill, 814 F.2d at 1202:
The text of Rule 38, and our previous decisions applying it, provide all the notice that an at
torney could reasonably demand that sanctions may be imposed on counsel directly for the
making of frivolous legal arguments in this court - and imposed without a hearing, if there
are no factual questions.
Id.; see also In re Perry, 918 F.2d at 935:

Practitioners in this court are expected to know and follow the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the precedents in the court's published jurisprudence. Rule 38 provides for
sanctioning frivolous appeals. From an early date, this court has indicated that it will not
hesitate to apply sanctions against parties and their counsel in appropriate cases . . . [a]ll
members of the bar of this court, including Perry, have thus long been on notice that they
may be personally liable for sanctions if they prosecute a frivolous appeal. (citations omit
ted).
Id. But see Hill, 814 F.2d at 1207-08 (Parsons, J., dissenting):

There is to be drawn a distinction between the general notice about sanctions and notice that
sanctions are being considered. Traditional procedural steps should always be taken before
assessment of a penalty is made. . . . The need to deter frivolous litigation should never be
considered demanding enough to cause us judges to weaken those structures of fundamental
fairness upon which our judicial system rests.
Id.

125. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 38 Advisory Comm. Note (discussing 1994 amendments);
Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[Appellant's attorney]
is not entitled to an opportunity for written or oral explanation - we need afford no oppor
tunity to explain misstatements and distortions in the briefs when their inaccuracy is appar
ent and no possible explanation could j ustify their inclusion.").
126. See In re Perry, 918 F.2d at 936 ("[T]he 'hearing' requirements of Rule 46 (c) [of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] have not been incorporated into Rule 38.");
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court can safely follow Judge Posner's approach in Hill: after the court
determined that the appeal was objectively frivolous, the court im
posed sanctions on the appellant's attorney and gave appellee fifteen
days to submit proper documentation of costs to the clerk of the court,
after which appellant was given an opportunity to respond.127
B.

The "Institutional Appellant" Exception

One danger of imposing the full burden of Rule 38 sanctions on at
torneys is that sophisticated institutional appellants will escape blame
in cases where they deserve it. In cases where the appellant must rely
completely on the advice of the attorney, the argument that the attor
ney should bear the full burden of sanctions is particularly strong.128
Yet, where the party is a large, sophisticated institution, a court should
bring sanctions jointly against the attorney and the client, since the
two are in the best position to determine who (between the two of
them) caused the appeal to be filed .129 An analogy to the arguments in
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 supports this view. The
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 suggests the appropriateness of
an "additional inquiry" into the propriety of assessing sanctions
against the party itself (along with the attorney) when that party is a
governmental agency or institutional party, since those bodies typi
cally put significant restrictions on their attorneys' discretionP0 In the

Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987) (arguing that an adversarial, evi
dentiary hearing is not required); Hill, 814 F.2d at 1201:
(W)e believe absolutely that an attorney ordered to pay money as a sanction for the filing of
a frivolous suit or appeal is entitled to due process of law, and that this entitlement includes
an opportunity for a hearing if a factual question concerning the propriety of sanctions is
raised . . . . But obviously the right to a hearing . . . is limited to cases where a hearing would
assist the court in its decision. Where, as in this and most Rule 38 cases, the conduct that is
sought to be sanctioned consists of making objectively groundless legal arguments in briefs
filed in this court, there are no issues that a hearing could illuminate.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Martineau, Frivolous Appeals, supra note 21, at 876:

The courts have provided no uniform definition of a hearing, and have emphasized that the
type of hearing required will vary from case to case. Courts seldom discuss whether an oral
hearing is necessary when a motion is made in the appellate court. The oral argument on the
merits is the only oral portion of the appellate process, and in many cases even the merits are
decided on the basis of briefs with no oral argument. Various motions are uniformly made
and acted upon without an oral hearing. Appellate Rule 27, which governs motions in the
courts of appeals, does not require an oral hearing on any type of motion, substantive or
procedural. Consequently, there does not appear to be any more reason to require an oral
hearing on a motion for a frivolous appeal sanction than on any other type of motion.
Id. (citation omitted).

127. See Hill, 814 F.2d at 1203; see also Wilton, 188 F.3d at 678 (Gilman, J., concurring).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 105-108.
129. United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Phoenix Petroleum, 727 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1984).
130. FED. R. APP. P. 38 Advisory Comm. Note (discussing 1993 Amendments):
When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether
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Rule 38 context, courts have demonstrated an ability to make this ad
ditional inquiry into the "sophistication" of the client, as well.131 This is
only a narrow exception that is consistent with the objectivity required
by Rule 38 (i.e., it does not inquire into the "bad faith" intent of an at
torney or the appellant). Furthermore, it is consistent with Rule 38's
deterrence goal, discussed below, because it seeks to place the blame
on the individuals who are truly responsible for the frivolous argu
ments presented to the court.
Ill. THE DETERRENCE GOAL . . . AND ITS LIMIT
Section III.A argues that an objective, single-step reasonable at
torney test is best for achieving the policy goal of deterring frivolous
appeals. Section 111.B argues that courts should make an exception to
the objective reasonable attorney test when an appellant proceeds pro
se. In such cases, an inquiry into the pro se appellant's practical legal
experience is appropriate to determine whether to impose sanctions.
A.

Deterring Frivolous Appeals Is the Name of the Game

At its core, Rule 38 is an instrument for discouraging attorneys
from filing frivolous appeals.132 To this end, an obj ective, single-step
reasonable attorney test is preferable to a test that requires an inquiry
into an attorney's subjective state of mind. This is true for two reasons.
First, because an attorney's subjective intent is often difficult to prove,
the threat of sanctions authorized by Rule 38 - or any other rule - is
considerably less ominous if courts require evidence of an attorney's
bad faith.133 Second, courts applying standards that take into account

the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties . . . in addition to . . . the
person actually making the presentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be
appropriate in cases involving government agencies or other institutional parties that fre
quently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by
it.
Id.

131. E.g., Phoenix Petroleum, 727 F.2d 1579; Potamkin, 689 F.2d 379; McConnell v.
Crtichlow, 661 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1981); Cummings v. United States, 648 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1981); In re Cont'! Inv. Corp., 642 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1 981); Lowe v. Willacy, 239 F.2d 179 (9th
Cir. 1956).
132. Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hagerty v. Succes
sion of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that Rule 38 sanctions present
the most promising tool for discouraging attorneys from bringing frivolous appeals in the
future)).
133. See Martineau, Ways of the Circuits, supra note 18, at 661 ("A requirement of bad
faith adds a scienter requirement . . . . This requirement minimizes the effectiveness of the
sanctions a court authorizes."); Michael L. Lamb, Comment, Awards of Attorneys' Fees
Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U. L. REV. 950, 963 (1980) ("A
malice standard as applied to attorneys substantially limits the circumstances in which bad
faith can be found.").

1180

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 100:1156

an attorney's subjective state of mind are often unwilling to punish ac
tions undertaken by an attorney in his representative capacity.134 This
unwillingness is particularly conspicuous when courts must apply a
"malice" standard, as they must when they entertain a section 1927 or
malicious prosecution action.135 For example, in deciding whether to
impose section 1927 sanctions, one court excused from liability an at
torney who knowingly, but reluctantly, brought a meritless suit at his
client's behest.136 Thus, a standard requiring evidence of an attorney's
bad faith narrows the range of circumstances under which courts are
willing to find and punish attorney misconduct137 and thereby enables
an attorney acting in his representative capacity to file an appeal con
taining groundless arguments without fear of sanction - even if he
knows the arguments presented in the appeal are objectively frivo
lous.138
The rationale for imposing Rule 1 1 sanctions against attorneys,
also useful to an understanding of Rule 38,139 supports the argument
that a reasonable attorney test is best for deterring frivolous appeals.
For example, in Berwick Grain Co.
Agriculture, an attorney appealing the
upon him by the district court offered as
he looked for legal support before he

v. Illinois Department of
Rule 1 1 sanctions imposed
his excuse that, even though
filed his motion, he found

none.140 The appellate court rejected his excuse and found that he
should not have filed the lawsuit in the first place.141 As that court ar
gued, the very point of Rule 11 sanctions is to lend incentive for attor
neys to "stop, think, and investigate more carefully before serving and
filing papers."142 Similarly, one of the primary purposes of Rule 38
sanctions is "to encourage attorneys to be reflective about the issues
they present for review,"143 since an appeal should not be a "knee jerk

134. Lamb, supra note 133, at 963 n.116 ("An attorney can only be liable for malicious
prosecution if he went beyond his representative capacity.") (quoting R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 45.15 (Supp. 1980)).
135. See id. at 963.

·

136. See id. (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Lakeshore Comm. Fin. Corp., 389 F.Supp. 1216,
1224 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (refusing to sanction an attorney pursuant to § 1927 without proof
that the suit "was prompted by [plaintiff's) counsel rather than or without the consent of [the
plaintiff]")).
137. Cf. id.
138. Cf. id.
139. See, e.g., Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1 192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1987)
(looking to Rule 11 in order to understand Rule 38's rationale).
140. 217 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2000).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990)).
143. Int'! Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985).
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reaction" to an unfavorable ruling.144 Thus, it follows that it is best for
deterrence purposes that the attorneys themselves bear the burden of
Rule 38 sanctions as well since "penalizing the [appellant] 'will not
guarantee that his attorney will be directly affected or that he will be
deterred from filing similar frivolous appeals in the future. ' "145 This
approach takes into account the realities of the attorney-client rela
tionship.146
This is not to say that a reasonable attorney standard is the only
standard that, if permitted under Rule 38, would effectively deter
frivolous appeals. Some advocate an "intentional abuse" standard for
awarding attorney sanctions.147 Courts have used this standard, which
represents a compromise between a bad faith standard and a negli
gence standard, to evaluate an attorney's conduct when they have ap
plied analogous sanctions, such as section 1927 and malicious prosecu
tion sanctions.148 Under this standard, a court must make a two-step
analysis.149 First, the court must make an objective determination that
a reasonable attorney would not have filed such a meritless appeal.150
Second, a court must determine that the appellant's attorney knew the
appeal was baseless, but filed it anyway.151 Circumstantial evidence of
ten proves an attorney's knowledge under this standard: a court can
infer from a meritless legal argument that the attorney was aware of
the argument's groundlessness.152 Considering the appellee's limited
access to proof, it is arguable that the inference of knowledge should
be a presumption
activated, of course, only after the objective stage
-

of the analysis has been satisfied.153 Thus, such a standard could rid the
courts of a good number of the evidentiary problems that might allow
a blameworthy attorney to avoid liability under a bad faith standard.154
144. See id. (quoting Libby, McNeill & Libby v. City Nat'! Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 515 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
145. Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hagerty v. Succes
sion of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1984)).
146. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 564, n.10 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Tradi
tionally, "courts have treated the attorney as the client's agent so that the attorney's acts and
omissions legally bind the client. Because this approach ignores the realities of the lawyer
client relationship, there has been a trend to seek to impose penalties upon only the offend
ing lawyer.").
147. E.g. , Lamb, supra note 133, at 966-68.
148. See id. at 966 (citing Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th
Cir. 1968), cert denied, 399 U.S. 908 (1969) (§ 1927); Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375 (Me.
1977) (malicious prosecution)).
149. See id. at 967.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 967.

1182

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1156

While an intentional abuse standard may be desirable in cases involv
ing analogous sanctions such as section 1927, this standard is imper
missible in the context of Rule 38, which has no bad faith require
ment.155 By applying an objective, single-step reasonable attorney test
for Rule 38, and by imposing the burden of Rule 38 sanctions against
an appellant's attorney, courts can best deter frivolous appeals in a
manner that is also consistent with the language of Rule 38.
B.

The Limit: A Pro Se Exception to the Reasonable Attorney Test

Where an appellant proceeds pro se and has no practical experi
ence in the law, courts should contain their efforts to deter frivolous
appeals by refraining from imposing Rule 38 sanctions.156 It is contrary
to Rule 38's deterrence goal for courts to impose sanctions against pro
se appellants who, because they are not attorneys themselves, often do
not fully understand why the legal arguments they present to the court
have no merit. As one court explained, Rule 38 seeks to discourage
only the "blameworthy acts" of "ignoring or purposefully disregarding
the law and procedure."157 These are "areas of the expertise customar
ily committed to counsel" who can provide "sound advice on both the
law and procedure."158
It is, however, consistent with the purpose of Rule 38 for a court to
assess sanctions against a pro se appellant who has had some practical
legal experience or training. A court's inquiry into an appellant's prac
tical legal experience would, of course, be a second step following the
court's initial objective assessment of the merits of the appeal. Courts
have demonstrated an ability to make such an inquiry to determine
whether or not to impose Rule 38 sanctions.159 For example, one court
assessed Rule 38 sanctions against a corporation president, even
though the president was proceeding pro se, because he had practical
experience dealing with attorneys; sanctions were appropriate because
the president should have understood that the reason many attorneys
refused to represent him in the matter was that his position was objec
tively frivolous.160 While this approach is not entirely consistent with

155. See supra Section I.A.
156. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981) (refraining from in
voking Rule 38 sanctions against pro se appellant in a tax dispute, even though the appel
lant's arguments were stale and had longstanding precedent aligned against them).
157. Hilmon Co. v. Hyatt Int'I, 899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990).
158. Id.
159. See Hilman, 899 F.2d at 254. (assessing damages against pro se appellant because of
the appellant's "practical experience with the law"); see also Clark v. Green, 814 F.2d 221
(Sth Cir. 1987); Clarion Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1974).
160. Clarion Corp., 494 F.2d 860.
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the single-step attorney reasonableness test advocated by this Note, it
is consistent with Rule 38's underlying purpose.
CONCLUSION
This Note argued that the language and legislative history of Rule
38 indicate that an objective, single-step reasonable attorney test is the
most appropriate test under Rule 38. It also argued that courts should
ordinarily assess the full burden of the sanction - the objective meas
ure of the attorney fees and costs - against the appellant's attorney.
Not only does this approach conform to the plain meaning of the stat
ute, it is also best from a policy perspective because it seeks to deter
those who are typically responsible for filing objectively frivolous legal
arguments - the attorneys. Several qualifications to the reasonable
attorney test, discussed above, balance the Rule 38 policy of deterring
frivolous claims against competing policy concerns - such as the con
cerns that novel appeals will be "chilled," that blame will be unfairly
assigned to pro se appellants, or that the entire burden of sanctions
will be unfairly placed on attorneys who work for sophisticated institu
tional parties who give little decision-making authority to their attor
neys. In sum, a one-step reasonable attorney test for Rule 38, coupled
with the imposition of Rule 38 sanctions against the attorneys who are
responsible for presenting frivolous arguments to the courts, promises
not only to help appellate courts stay afloat, but also to ensure that
courts imposing such sanctions do so only in appropriate circum
stances.

